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Draft Recommendation
The Assemb;,*" 
o"iceforces - reply to the annual report of the Council
(t) Recalling the activities of the WEU police and customs operation on the Danube from June
1993 to October 1996 to monrtor the embargo agamst the Rcpubhcs of Serbia and Montcnegro,
(it) Recalling the mission of the WEU Police Element rn Mostar from July 1994 to October 1996;
(iir) Considering the actrvrties of the Multinational Advrsory Police Element (MApE) whose
mandate began in July 1997 and u,elcomrng rts recent extensron to April 1999,
(iv) Emphasrsing that the mrsslons on the Danube and in Mostar were successful, rvhile rn Albanra
the currcnt misston of MAPE, which is increasrng m number and gaining strength, has alrcady had a
significant lmpact on its area of activity, although a great deal remams to be done as regards provrdrng
advice, basic trarning, specnlised trarnrng, and equipment and logrstic support;
(r) Considerrng that police officers from all countnes partrcrpating rn futurc WEU pohce mrsslons
should have similar status and should be pard accordrng to the same standards,
(w) Welcoming thc fact that rn the framervork of the MAPE missron m Albanra, very satrsfurng
cooperatlon has been estabhshed betrveen WEU 
- 
coordmatrng the MAPE mrssion 
- 
and the European
Commtssion 
- 
funding a PFIARE equrpment prograrnme for the Albanian police forces.
(w) Considering that the abovementroned actrvrtres have enabled WEU to garn consrderable
experience rn the organrsation and deployment of police mrssions;
(wu) Arvare that rn specrfic crisis srtuations there rs apparentlv an increasrng necd for specrahsed
pohce misstons rvhrch do not entirelv correspond to the Petersberg mrssrons as formulatcd rn 1992.
(rx) Notrng that there mav also be a requirement ln peacekeeprng operatrons for specralised pohce
unrts u'ith speclfic capabilrtres in the areas of not control and the marntenance of pubhc order. these
being tasks rvhich are not usually entrusted to armed forces.
(x) Arvare thatthere ts a requirement rn thc neu'mandate SFOR xrll have after June 1998 for an
armed specral pohce element, but that the detarled arrangcments for thrs element have not l,et been
defined orvmg to retlcencc on the part of a number of European countnes.
(n) Consrderrng tn parttcular that manl' WEU countnes havc speciahsed pohcc forces or srmrlar
forces equrppcd and trained for the abovementroned tasks.
(nr) Consrdering the readiness of some WEU assocratc partners, such as Slovenia. to partrcrpate ln
forthcoming policc operatrons,
(nu) Aware that the WEU Planning Cell has thc servrces of a police officer for the planning of pohcc
operatrons,
(nv) Considerrng that rn view of these nerv requlrements. WEU should adapt rts structures and
procedures so that lt can respond quickly and adequatelv to requests for spccrahsed pohce mlsslons.
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COTJNCIL
L Ask each member country to identrfi' pohce officers rr'rth expencncc in rntemational pohce
operations rvho could partlclpate ln any reconnaissance or advance party for future polrce missrons. if
need be, rn order to ensure vltally rmportant contrnuitr,.
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2 Estabfish a Pohcy, Sub-Group for WEU pohce mrssrons u'hrch should mcct at least once a year
and whrch could be actrvated rn the evcnt of emcrgency tn ordcr to set the agcnda for prepartng anl'
specifi c police misston,
3 Estabfish structurcs for close coordmatron with the European Uruon and other organisailons such
as the OSCE and the United Natrons m order to facrlrtate the rapid dcployment of speciahsed pohce
forces in crisrs sttuatlons rf requrred,
4. Ask the countries partlcrpatlng rn WEU to commit specralised police unlts answcrable to WEU,
simrlar to the existrng FAWEU, rvhich could constitute the core of a raprd actron police force
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Exp lanatory M e mor s n du m
(submitted by Mr Giannaltasio, Rapporteur)
Introduction
I Ovcr the past ferv years the drspatch of
pohce forces has been an actrve part of WEU's
pohcy initratives. Around the same time that
WEU and NATO naval forccs rvere monitorrng
comphance rn the Adrratic urth UN Secuntv
Council resolutions against former Yugoslavia,
WEU embarked on its first pohce mrssion on the
Danube, undertaken in June 1993 in order to
provrde assrstance to the rrparian states 
- 
Bul-
gana, Hungary and Romania 
- 
m rmplementing
the arrns embargo and cconomlc sanctlons
against the Republics of Serbia and Montencgro.
WEU decided to send 250 pohce and customs
offrcers from eight member countnes and I I fast
patrol boats to help local officers ensure that
shrpprng rnsrde three control areas on the Danube
comphed wrth L|NSC resolutrons Measures
taken rncluded halting and drvertrng ships to in-
spect and verifli their cargoes and destrnatlons
The operation ended in October 1996, folloivrng
terminatron of tIN embargoes agarnst the Federal
Repubhc of Yugoslavia In total. some 6748 rn-
spections u'ere made and 422 rnfrrngements re-
ported, u,ith violatrons of the embargocs unfor-
tunatell, havrng occurred during the operatron.
2. During the Danube mrssron WEU mounted
a further pohce operation. thrs time rn Bosnra and
Herzegovrna Thrs began rn Jul1, 1994 n.rth a
request from the European Uruon for assrstancc
to the EU Admrnrstration in the drvrded crtl' of
Mostar, whrch rvas tom apart betu,een Croats
and Mushms. In addrtron to provrdtng assrstance
to the EU Admrnrstrator on aspccts of pubhc
order, the WEU Police Element, compnsing
some 182 offrcers from all categones of member
states, sought to contribute to the settrng-up of a
srngle, unified pohce force m Mostar. To achieve
that goal. joint patrols \4'ere carried out whlch
rncluded both Croat and Muslim officers, but
progress u'as slow on account of persrstent drs-
trust betu,een the two parties and a lack of politi-
cal rvill to cooperate. The WEU Police Element
contributed to the smooth runnrng of the munrcr-
pal electrons in Junc and by October 1996. to-
u'ards the end of the mrssion, rt had succeeded in
setting up a joint police force of 209 offrcers
Authority rvas subsequentlv transferred from
WEU to the LN Internatronal Pohce Task Force,
rvhrch u'as to overscc the pohce actlvltlcs and the
estabhshment of a securc environment for the
munrcipal electrons in Bosnia, whrch eventuallv
took place rn September 1997.
3 WEU's thrrd pohce mlsslon rvas carried
out srr months later rn Albanra, rvhere the col-
lapse of pyramid financc schemes at the begin-
nrng of 1997 threu' the countn' into complete
chaos The Albanran Government appealed for
rnternailonal milrtarl, rnterventron to restore
order Wrthin WEU, how'ever, no consensus
could be reached for the deplolment of a WEU
mrlrtan'force and mstcad rt was decided to send
a Multrnatronal Advrsory Pohce Elemcnt
(MAPE) to assist thc Albanran pohce force,
*hrch had fallen rnto a state of complete disar-
ra)' WEU sent 42 pohce offrcers to provrde
trarnrng and adl'ice to the Albanian officers on
such rssues as pubhc order, human nghts and
border pohcrng In thc pcnod from Ma1, 16
December 1997 WEU provrded training for some
300 Albanran offrcers, and further courses have
startcd srnce then
Part I 
- 
Danube enforcement operation
L Romaniu's request for assistance
4. WEU's first pohce mrsslon took place
dunng the x'ar rn former Yugoslavra, on the
Danubc rlver Thrs operatron started rn June
1993. about the same trme that WEU and NATO
n'ere conductrng embargo enforcement operatrons
rn the Adnatrcr UN Secuntr., Council Resol-
utrons 757 and 187 (1992) instrtuted economrc
embargoes agarnst the Federal Yugoslav Repub-
hc of Serbra and Montenegro, conslsttng of a ban
on the rmport and export of goods and all trans-
port actrvltlcs tn respect of those countries A
ban uas also rmposed on the translt through
Serbra and Montenegro of \,'anous products such
as crudc orl and orl products. coal. energ)
equipment and stcel and other mctals The ripar-
r f- ,n*a rnforma[on on the Adnattc op€rauon. see
Assemblv Document 1396 An operatnnal organtsatton
for W;El:. naval cooperatton - Porl One -.ldnalrc
operattons, Rapportcurs Mr Marten and Srr Kerth
Spcrcd. 9 November 1993
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lan governments \\'cre authonsed to take thc ncc-
essar)' mcasures to ensurc that shrpprng on thc
Danube comphed u'rth all resoluttons. but rt bc-
camc clcar that the UN embargo uas betng
floutcd both at border crossrngs and bv rtver
traffic on thc Danubc. The OSCE. the EU and
the Unrted States dccrdcd to set up Sancttons
Assrstance Mtsstons (SAMs) rn the nerghbouring
countrics to cooperate on technlcal matters The
marn problems encountcred u'ere thc use of
documents containing false rnformatron about the
cargo and destrnation of goods, refusal to submit
to rnspections and the use of flags of other coun-
tnes, espccralll' on the Danube In addrtron. a
lack of resources prevented the mspectton of all
cargo€s
5. Romanra. at that trme a member of the
WEU Forum of Consultatton urth central Euro-
pean states. madc a direct request to WEU for
help rn monttortng tts bordcr ivrth Serbra The
Councrl inrtrally reframed from taking action be-
cause ''as such requests u'ould be of a ctvtltan
nature, thel' *'ould not concem WEU as such
Thel' could bc better handled tn othcr frame-
u'orks such as the EC or the CSCE' The As-
sembll's Standrng Commtttee urged the Councrl
to help Romanta police the border urth Serbta
and to estabhsh srmilar hnks u'rth other nergh-
bouring countnes tn the regton In October 1992
Sir Dudlel' Smrth visrted Romanta at the tnvrta-
tron of the Romantan authonttes and sau' that
Romanra lackcd many' of the technrcal skrlls ncc-
essan to fully' implement thc embargo and that
the embargo u'as betng apphed at constderable
cost to the countn' ln partrcular. Romanta rvas
havrng scrlous drffrcultres m poltcmg the border
u'rth Serbra and requestcd help to cstabhsh ar-
rangcments wrth other netghbounng countrles
The WEU Permanent Councrl agreed rn princrple
on l6 March to send poltce forces and equtpment
to Hungarl', Romanta and Bulgaria and the final
offer rvas made at thc mtntsterial meetrng tn Lux-
embourg on 5 Apnl 1993 ri'here WEU mrnrsters
offered therr concrcte support to the rlparlan
states rn the form of the organlsatlon of a pohce
and customs operatron on the Danube The WEU
mlsslon uould provide assrstance to the compe-
tent authoritres (natronal customs servtce) of the
rrparian states rvith lnspectlon and monttonng of
the rrver traffic upstrcam and dounstream of thc
FRY Thrs u'ould tnvolvc 
.1otnt tcams of pohce
and customs officers from WEU countrtes and
the nparran states. opcratlng from fast patrol
boats to carn' out tnspccttons tn addrtton to thosc
of the rrpanan states In csscnce an operatlon
was envlsaged to carrl' out checks and surverl-
lance of the traffic on thc Danube rn much the
same \\'a)' as the WEU naval operatlon rn the
Adnailc was conducted
II. The mission
6 In Apnl 1993 WEU sent a fact-findrng
mlssron to vanous srtes along the Danube to as-
sess their surtabrhtl' for use as WEU bases,
WEU rvas to be deploy'ed at strategrc ports, the
so-called Control Areas, u'hrch rncluded Calafat
n Romania. Mohacs rn Hungary and Ruse tn
Bulgana. uhere thc WEU offtcers rvould halt
ships rn order to vcrtfl' thetr cargoes and destrn-
ations A coordtnatton and support centre uas sct
up rn Calafat, hnked to WEU Headquarters.
After the srsnature betrvecn WEU and the rtpar-
lan go\/errurrents of the Memorandum of Undcr-
standrng definrng the tasks to be performed and
therr rmplementatton, dcplo1'ment started on
l8 June 1993 In total, some 250 pohce and
customs officers u'crc betng sent from seven
member statcsr, together u'tth some I I fast patrol
boats. Thrs mtsston xas to become the first
concrcte example of cooperation betu'een WEU
and rts assoctatc partners
7 Durrng thc mrsston some 6 748 inspectrons
rvere made. u'rth the drscovery' of 422 embargo
rnfnngements. although rt should be borne tn
mrnd that thesc u.crc onll' supposed embargo tn-
fnngements. slnce rt u'as not possrble to have
srght of the outcomc of the prosecuttons rnrtiated
on the basrs of WEU reports Unfortunatcly.
manr- l'rolatrons occurred durrng the mtsston. but
thc exact daLa have not becn revealed b1' the
Councrl Onc drfficultl' u'as thc fact that en-
forcement of the embargo operatlon lvas carrted
out rn drfferent \\a)'s ln the vanous host nattons
In Calafat. rn March 1995, a Bulgartan-regts-
tered vessel. the -'Han Kubrat". urth 5 000 tons
of non-dcclared fuel on board, u'as allorr-ed to
break the cmbargo u'htle tn Mohacs tn June
1995. a Ukratntan-regtstered vessel. thc
"Zadonsk". carn'rng 44 5 tons of non-declarcd
L 
^- France, Germanl, Italr', Lurembourg, thc Nether-
lands, Spa-rn and thc Urutcd Itngdom
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fuel, was stormed by Hunganan Specral Forces,
who arrested the entire creu'
8. Although the inspectrons on the Danube
reduced trade with Serbra, neu, tradrng routcs
emerged, princrpally through FYROM and Al-
bania. The Unrted States and Europe virtually,
gave up trl,ing to enforce the sanctions in
FYROM because the country was suffering on
account of rts own economlc embargo imposed
by Greece. In Albania, the leadership was too
reluctant to interfere lvrth the trade because rt
made a great deal of profit from lt
9. With the entry into force of the Dayton
Peace Agreement and the deployrnent of IFOR rn
Bosnra and Herzegovina, the WEU operation on
the Danube was suspended on 24 September
1996, follorving the decisron by the UN to sus-
pend sanctions against the Federal Repubhc of
Yugoslavia, wrth the proviso that thel' would be
rermposed rf the FRY did not srgn the Peace
Agreement concluded rn Day,ton. At this point rn
the operatron no checks were carned out. The
polrtical task of the operation was modrfied to
ensure raprd reactrvation of the mtsslon should
the embargo be rermposed. On I October 1996,
IIN Security Resolution 1074 lifted economrc
sanctlons agalnst the FRY and, the day after, the
WEU Council termrnated the Danube operatron,
at the same time as the mrssion on the Adnatrc
came to an end
III. Evaluation
l0 Although the mrssron contnbuted to
bnnging embargo infrmgements to light, several
obstacles obstructed the effrcrency of the entrre
operatlon. The control areas should have been as
close as possible to the sensitrve terntones but
the Calafat control area was in fact 150 km ari'ay
from the Serbran border, whrch meant that the
river bed adloining Bulgana rvas not controlled
by WEU. The Ruse location control area and the
Galatr checkpoint were even less surtable and
their only' value was for collecting statistical in-
formation Control area Mohacs located close to
the Serbian border was the onll, rcal strategrc
pomt
I l. Smce one of the arms of the mrssron was,
as requested by the Danube Commrssion
(Geneva) to prevcnt obstructions to nver navig-
ation, the time available for carryrng out controls
rvas reduced to the minimum, rvhrch meant that
there rvcre no controls rn drfficult chmatic condr-
trons or durrng the nrght Thrs also served to
mlnlmlse the risks to WEU officers but rt rs reas-
onable to assume the operatrons rvould have
shown more substantral and effectrve rcsults rf
the trme devoted to controls had bcen greater
12 At WEU Hcadquarters, contacts u,ith
other internatronal organrsatrons rnvolved on the
Danube were hmrted Thc EU and OSCE u'ere
jorntly responsrblc for the SAMs Communicatron
Centre (SAMCOMM) rn Brussels but there rvere
no officral links ivrth WEU Headquarters It
mrght have bcen useful for WEU HQ to have
deployed a harson offrcer to SAMCOMM srnce
such an arrangement u'ould have led to a more
structured divrsron of labour betrveen the
EU/OSCE river teams and the WEU mrssron
13 A more general pornt was the fact that
during the Danube mrssion not cnough use \\'as
made of harson officcrs and pornts of contact to
cnsure coherence betuccn the drfferent aspects of
the mrssion When the mlsslon started, a key
WEU document on Operational Development
had still to be approved. After rts approval.
points of contact n'ere dcsrgnated in subsequent
mrssions to provrde contrnurty rn the tuo-$'av
contact process betucen commanders and WEU
HQ
Part II 
- 
Police forces in Moslar -
the UPFM (Uni/ied Police Force Mostar)
I. Background to lltEU's decision
on Mostar
14. Managemcnt of the conflrct rn Bosnra and
Herzegovma for nhrch both Europe and the
Unrted States u'crc badll' prepared has becn a
maJor concern from rts begrmmg for all the
countrres rnvolved Among the multrtudc of
problems u.as thc attcmpt bv secessronrst Croat
forces to enforce therr clarm to an mdependent
"Herceg-Bosna" s'ith Mostar, one of the most
ethnrcally-mrxed citrcs of Bosnra and Herze-
govina, as rts capital. Mostar u'as severelr dam-
aged by the Serbs n 1992 and s'as drvrded rn
tu'o in I993 b1, cn'rl stnfe betlveen the Croats on
the rvestern and the Bosnrans on the eastern slde
of the crty After the resrgnatlon of thc Bosnran-
Croat leader, Mate Boban, u,ho u'as stronglv rn
favour of a separatrst Croat repubhc. a ceasefire
was eventually signed betu'een the Bosntan Gov-
emment and Croat forccs carlv rn 1994 u'hrch
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\\'as subsequently monrtored b1' UNPROFOR
The Unitcd States put fonvard a plan for a con-
fcderatron of Muslim and Croat regrons of Bos-
nra Herzegovrna, whrch after lengthl' negotlatlons
resulted in the Washrngon Agreements of
16 March 1994, srgned by' Presidents Tud.;man
of Croatra and Izetbegovrc of Bosnta and Herzc-
govma These envisaged a confcderation drvided
rnto Swiss-style cantons tn u'hrch power u'ould
be shared by the two constltuent ethntc groups.
The responsibilrties of the Federation would rn-
clude defence, intemal affatrs, lustice, finance
and refugees and displaced persons. The gov-
ernment of the Repubhc as a u'hole would remain
responsible for areas such as foreign pohcy,
trade, customs and the civrlian coordrnation of
the activrties of the armed forces. Nerv federal
rnstitutions gradually emerged u'htch rvere to
functron rn parallel rvith the extstmg oncs, until
the full rmplementatron of the federal constttu-
tron A new government, drau.n lorntly from the
Republic of Bosnra and Herzegovina and the nerv
Mushm-Croat Federation and led b1'Haris Srla;-
dzrc, took office in late June 1995 The nerv
government of the Federatton could not hox'ever
start to function unttl a comprehenstve peace deal
for Bosnia and Herzegovrna had been concludcd
15 Under the Washington Agreements the
drvrded multr-ethnrc crty' of Mostar lvas sched-
uled to be reunified under the supervtston of an
EU admrnrstration The estabhshment of an ad-
mrnistration rn Mostar rvas regarded as a test of
the vrabilrtv of the Mushm-Croat Federation and
rn Jull' 1994 the European Uruon assumed res-
ponsibrlrty for the admrnistratron of MosLar un-
der the leadershrp of Hans Koschnrk Shortll'
aftenvards the EU asked WEU to contnbute to
the missron by sendrng a pohce clement to asslst
the EU Admrnistrator and help cstabhsh a pohce
forcc in Mostar Although some progress \\'as
made inrtrally rvrth the srgnrng of an agreement
estabhshrng a demrlitarised zonc around Mostar
and a promise to remove all barrrcades rn the
crty, Iocal Croat leaders remamed sceptrcal of the
EU mrssron and anxrous to consohdate therr pos-
rtron ln the Croat-controlled zone In March
1995 a Muslim-Croat mrlrtary alltancc \\'as
srgned and a package of measures \\'as adopted to
hasten progrcss rn cstablishrng federal nstltu-
trons, rncluding a federal pohce force [n sprte of
these efforts, mutual distrust bcts'een the tu'o
partles persisted
16 The Dayton Peace Agreement, u'htch for-
malll' put an end to the armed confltct tn Bosnta
and Herzegovina, dtvtdcd the country tnto trvo
Entrtrcs, u'ith 49% of the terntorv gorng to the
Serbs and 5lo/o to the Muslim-Croat Federatron
These trvo Entrtres were to be linked by a federal
structure, providrng for a central government
u'rth a democraticalll, elected collective presi-
denq,and a parliamcnt based in Saralevo, At the
same trme, Presrdents Tudlman and Izetbegovic
srgned an agreement designed to rcinforce the
Muslim-Croat Federation agreement, the most
ambrtious aspect of rvhrch was the untficatton of
Mostar as the capital of the Federation Mostar
was to become a unified crtl' rvrth six muntci-
palitres each run by' a drffercnt admmtstrattve
structure. Horvever, severc tenslon aross bet$'een
Croats and Mushms tn Mostar rn earll' 1996,
when the EU Admrnrstrator proposed the forma-
tion of a central Muslim-Croat drstrict Thts was
not provided for rn the Darton Peace Agreement
and u'as strongly opposed b1' the Croats, rvho
w'anted the crtv to exlst as slx separate muntci-
palrtres, unrted onlv tn a functtonal and legal
sense. An agreement was reached at the Rome
mlnr surrunrt on 17-18 February 1996 ri'here a
neu' formula rvas adopted for the reunificatron of
Mostar, ruth an ethnrcallv mtxed poltce force
and full freedom of movement rvtthtn the crty.
l7 Electrons rn Mostar rvere scheduled to take
place in Ma1' 1996 but u'erc postponed untrl late
June. after Mushm polrtrcal partles tn eastern
Mostar refused to reglstcr in protest agatnst
electoral rules x'hrch. thel'argued. penaltsed non-
Croats displaced from Mostar b1'the xar Hard-
line Bosnian-Croat separatlsts agatn proclatmed
the formatron of a ne\\' government of ''Herccg-
Bosna'', an rnstrtutron u'hrch thev had agreed to
drssoh'e rn March. After protracted and drfficult
negotratrons. electrons to Mostar cttl' counctl
rvere held on 30 June. resultrng rn the vrctory of
thc multr-ethnic Crtizcn's List for a Unrted Mos-
tar (LGJM). a coalrtron grouped around the mam
Mushm party, u'hrch won most of thc votes cast
by rcfugees hving elseu'here It ri'as apparent that
voting had taken place according to cthnrc pref-
erences The main Croat partl', the Croatian
Dcmocratrc Unron, rvon most of the votes cast tn
the city itself, Ieadrng the Croats, backed b1'
President Tudlman. to refuse to recogntse the
election results. After medration by' thc EU and
\\.arnrngs from the US Presrdcnt, Croattan
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natronahst represcntatrves were finally, persuaded
to takc part rn the Mostar government rn August,
u'hen rt was agreed that an cthnrc Croat u,ould
hold the office of mayor and a Mushm rvould be
deputy'ma1or
18 The EU Adminrstrator's mandate ran out
in July 1996, rvhen the rcmainrng tasks were
taken on by the High Representatrve (Carl Brldt)
The WEU Police Element rvas maintarncd to
protect the EU Special Envov, u,ho was ap-
pointed at that time, untrl October 1996 u.hen the
Unitcd Nations Intematronal Pohce Task Force
(IPTF) took over from rt. Frnalh,, on 14 August
in Geneva, Mr Tud3man and Mr Izetbegovrc
signed an agreement on the transfer of pou.ers to
the Fcderation of Bosnia and Herzegovrna from
thc rnstitutions of the Repubhc of Bosnra and
Herzegovma and the self-proclarmed rcpubhc of
"Herceg-Bosna", rr,hrch then officralll' ceased to
exrst. All-Bosnia electrons wcre then held for a
three-member colleclve presidencv compnsrng a
Mushm, Croat and Serb representatn'e Mr Izet-
begovic riould serye as Chairman of the collec-
tive presrdencl' for a two-year term The presr-
dency 
- 
conststlng of Mr lzetbegovtc, Serb rep-
resentatlve Mr Kralrsnrk and Croat representa-
trve Mr Zubak- held its first informal meetmg m
Sara.;el,o on 5 October.
II. WEU Working Group on Mostar
19 At thc EU Gcneral Affarrs Councrl on
4 October 1993. rvhen the admrnrstratron of
Mostar lvas drscussed, Minrsters agreed to ask
WEU to consrder the support rt could provrde bl,
organlslng a police force and impror.'rng certarn
vrtal supply'functrons, rn partrcular rn the field of
medical asslstancc. The Pcrmanent Councrl dc-
cided to set up a special u'orkrng group to exam-
ine the personnel and financral requrremcnts for
sending a WEU police unit to Mostar Thc task
of such a urut would be to advise the EU Admin-
rstrator in Mostar, recrut and trarn local forccs
and particrpate in police actrvrtres. From the out-
set the Council made rt knoun that WEU rtself
u'as not rn a posrtion to determrne the ertent of
the responslbilrtres of the EU Admrnrstrator.
u,hich implied that any contnbutron from \l,EU
u'as depcndent on the EU's negotratrons Some
basrc prmcrples were estabhshed about WEU's
possible contrrbutron The operatron rvas to bc
under the authority of the EU Admrnrstrator and
the contrrbutron would only be m those fields not
covcred by the mrlrtary srdc of the agrcement In
addrtron. no structure u,ould be sct up rn Mostar
as long as no agrecment had bcen rmplemcnted
an\rl,herc else, because thc securrty' of such an
operatlon w'ould be at stakes. In fact. no progress
on thc deplolment of thrs planncd police opcra_
tron was made until March 1994
20. Follorvrng the Washrngton agreements of
l8 March 1994, which established the Croat and
Bosnran communrtrcs in Bosnla and Herze-
govma, WEU rvas again approached for a pos-
sible contnbution to the EU Admrnrstratton. as
envisaged in the agreements. WEU had devel-
opcd two options for a possrble contributron,
rangmg from merely supervisrng a specrfic
agrcement among the parties on pohcrng in
Mostar, to the possibilrty of rts actually
estabhshrng a pohce force m Mostar. carrymg
out dutrcs on the ground. The EU requested
WEU to focus on the sccond possrbrlrtl,,
compnsrng the supervrsion of the local pohce
forces and their future organisatron as a srngle
unrfied force Thc Councrl made rt clear that
WEU's u'ork u,as strll contingent on the negotia-
trons on Mostar betu'een the EU trorka and the
parties on the spota
2l In Aprrl 1994. WEU sent flvo top-level
pohce experts and tu'o members of the Plannrng
Cell to Mostar, in the framework of an EU pre-
paratory missron. to examlne the condrtrons un-
der rvhrch WEU might contnbute pohce forccs
and to promote confidence-burldrng measurcs
betu'ecn thc local forces Under the ausprces of
the preparaton' mlssron and urth WEU partrcr-
patron. the local pohce chiefs hcld therr first lornt
meeting ln over a vear
III. The mandate of the
WEU Police Element
22. On 5 July 1994 a Mcmorandum of Un-
dcrstandrng u'as signed rn Geneva betu.een the
EU. WEU and the Repubhc of Bosnra and
Herzegovrna. and came rnto effcct on 23 July
The rnrtral mandate of the WEU Policc Element
rs set out rn Articles 12 and l3 of the Memoran-
dum of Understandrng
3At**bii Document 1402, Commuruca[on from thc
Charman-rn0ffrce of the Council, 23 November i993.r Assembly Document 1422. Prcsrdenry report on
Mostar
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23 Artrclc 12 statcs that.
"A srngle pohce force, untfied at all levels.
rvrll be estabhshcd under the authontl' of
the EU Admtnrstrator The composttton of
thc police shall reflect, at all levels, that of
the populatlon ln the EU admtntstration
area It rvrll compnse an element of mter-
national partrcrpation, which rvrll be pro-
vrded b1' the Westem European Unton
(WEU) as part of the EU Admintstratron "
Artrcle 13 on the WEU Pohce Element reads
as follorvs
"l The WEU Pohce Element lvrll pro-
vide the EU Admrnrstrator u'tth rnforma-
tion and advtce on all aspects ofthe public
order srtuatton in Mostar, mcludmg confi-
dence-buildrng measures, movement of ref-
ugees, handhng of suspected rr-ar crimt-
nals.
It ri,rll advtse on establishmg selectton pro-
cedures, carfl'mg out the selectton and or-
ganrslng trarning takrng maxlmum ac-
count, mter alia, of present quahfied per-
sonneI and appropnate extsttng facrlrties
The WEU Police Element urll be entrtled
to organlse, admintster, dtrect and super-
vlsc some police funcilons. such as crtmi-
nal rnvestigatlon, protectton of VIPs, pub-
hc relattons at the level of central pohce
headquarters It wrll supervlse and monttor
other pohce functtons, such as carn'lng
out the ludgements ofcourts, guardrng and
transfer of civtltans ln custodr'. guardrng
of senstttvc areas, routlnc patrols. traffic
control, dtsarmmg of ctvtltans (rn the
course of regular pohce rvork). control of
persons and goods, protectton of ctvtltan
propeff\' at the level of local pohce sta-
trons
The WEU pohce officers u'tll tntttalh'
partlclpate at the level of central police
headquarters at appropriate rank. u'hlle
partrcrpatton at the level of local pohce
statrons rvrll take place sublect to thc Ad-
mrnrstrator' s assessment.
2 Tlie WEU Pohce Element rvrll be
drrected b1 a commisstoner lvho reports
drrectlv to the EU Admrnrstrator and re-
cetves hts tnstructrons from hrm
3. In order to cnsure the smooth tntegra-
tron of rts acttvtttcs rnto the ovcrall admtn-
rstrative framervork. the WEU Police Elc-
ment rvrll ltatse wtth authorrties tn Mostar
as u'ell with organrsations operating rn and
around Mostar
4 WEU pohce offtcers rvtll carrv regu-
lar police equrpment This may include
rndivrdual !\'eapons for sclf-defence pur-
poses Such weapons wrll be regtstered in
accordance wrth the mternational practicc
in srmilar mlsslons. All WEU personnel
rvill be drstinguishable as members of the
WEU mission by suitable, vistble identrfi-
cation
5 The police commisstoner wrll periodr-
cally' evaluate the pubhc order sttuation
and recommend adlustments, especialll'
u'ith regard to a selective change rn the
size and tnvolvement of the lnterna-
tionalMEU Police Element "
24. LNPROFOR monttored the process of
demilrtarisatron and the collectron of heaq'
\\'eapons through the establishment of collection
points and created a secure environment for the
EU Adminrstratton to operate tn Mostar The
WEU Pohce Element had no executive powers
and therefore could not. for instance, directll'
rnterfere or arrest suspects Its role was confined
to advrsrng the Admrnrstrator on all aspects of
public order as u'ell as organlslng, admtnrstertng
and supervrsmg some pohce functions in Mostar.
An addrtronal task n'as the monttonng of aspects
of hfe rn post-war Mostar, rncludrng the mannrng
of the checkpomts on the borders of thc Demrh-
tarised (Blue) Zone
IV. Organisation of the lltEU
Police Element
25 For operattonal reasons, the WEU Police
Element conststed of different sections. The
Operafions Department (Ops) v'as the scctton
carrylng out such overall tasks as operattonal
monitortng. securttr', mannlng checkpornts, pro-
vrdrng cscorts to VIPs etc. It rvas the largcst dc-
partment and provrded a pool of manporver for
specral events, such as the electrons. Incorporatcd
rn tt rvas the Speaal Invesfigafions Branch
(S1Bl, reinstated after lts unsuccessful removal
from Ops SIB rvas specifically' tasked rvtth tn-
vostlgatmg organtsed and violent crimc and con-
l0
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slsted of t$o elcments Cnme Watch and pans
Whecl Crimc Watch searchcd for perpctrators
and monrtored thc treatment of thosc rn custod1,,
checkrng the reasons for and the duratron of de-
tentron Paris Wheel concentrated on rnvestrga-
tron into organised vehrclc thcft, a ma.;or local
problem In additron, a drugs lnterventlon tcam
u'as bemg cstablished as the mandate closcd. on
the initratrve of the cast and west Mostar pohce
26 A nced u,as rdcntificd somc months rnto
the mtssron for a managenal thrnktank and a
scnior tcam to coordrnate pohcy among other
department heads. The Pohcy Planning Dcpart-
ment was set up ln the spring of 1995 to formu-
late, develop and revierv all WEU policv u.ith
regard to sl'stems, structures, proccdures and
goals It \\'as a small office, u.ith one senror and
t*'o middle-rankrng officers, and a team of trvo
local assrstants The Pohc1, Planntng Departmcnt
\\,as rcsponsrble for the scaltng doun of thc WEU
mrssion in Mostar and this demanded rntonsrve
harson rvith the EU Admrnrstratron, WEU rn
Brussels and the IPTF The department emergcd
as a kev plal'er ln negotlattons conducted b1. the
WEU Pohce Element rn Mostar, u'orkrng closely
ri'ith the Pohce Commrssioncr, rvho u'as the
pnncrpal pornt of contact for the WEU Presr-
dency, and Plannrng Cell
V. Implementation of the mandate
27 In the surrrmer of 1994 rt u'as dccrdcd to
conduct the pohce operation rn three phases The
first phase. tmplementatron. rvould consrst of thc
establishment of a iornt operatronal centre. com-
brned patrolhng. supervrslon and monrtonng
functrons at pohce statlons. identrficatron and
estabhshment of a recrurtmcnt plan cnsunng
selectron and trarnrng of local pohce officers
This phase \\'as supposed to be completed in Jull'
I995
28 The second phase. the operafional pro-
cess, rvould consrst of the estabhshment of a lornt
headquarters, thc rmplementatron of ;oint patrols,
rendering all pohcc stations fuII1, operational.
identrficatron of addrtional pohcrng requrrcments
and the rntensificatron of thc unrficatron process,
leadrng, as far as possrble. to a complctclv unr-
fied polce forcc Thrs u,as expected to bc rn
place bt'March 1996
29 The thrrd phasc, the transrttonal and
wrthdrawal phase- would complete thc unrfica-
tlon process. and thc exccutlon of the w'rthdrarval
of the WEU Pohce Elcmcnt. Aftcr transfer of
authorrtv to the neu, UPFM, WEU u,ould marn-
tam a consultatrvc and advrson, role in Mostar
The transrtron \r,as supposcd to be completed bi,
the cnd of Jull' 1996
30 An early' communlcatlons gap u'as filled
by the apporntment of a pohce officer to thc
WEU Plannrng Cell Prror to that date therc rvas
evidence of a lack of understanding of pohce
mattcrs at WEU headquarters In Mostar. the EU
Admrnistratron and the WEU Pohce Element
trred to folloiv the same timescale and framervork
but thrs proved to bc qurte impossrble Real
authonty over thc local pohce rvas never rn the
hands of the Admrnrstrator. mainll,because local
commanders still sari therr reporting hnes as
berng to thcrr oun polrtrcal masters. It u'as not
untrl Fcbruan, 1996 that the Admrnrstrator $'rote
a letter to the Fcdcratron Interror Mrntster statlng
that he rvould assume command over the pohcc
rn the Blue Zonc on I March
L7. The Unified Police Force in Mostar
(UPFM)
3l The Mostar operatlon resulted from the
first EU request to WEU to act on rts behalf as
envrsaged rn Article J 4 2 of the Treatl'of Maas-
tncht (currentlv Artrcle J 1 of the Treatl, of Am-
stcrdam) In the Lrsbon Declaratron, the WEU
Councrl of Mrnrstcrs "noted wlth satrsfactron that
measures to develop a close uorkrng relatronshrp
betu'ccn WEU and EU. foreseen rn thc Treaty on
European Umon. \\ere no\\' bcrng grven practrcal
cffect Thc Councrl partrcularlt' rvelcomcd the
close cooperatron betu'een the EU and WEU
Presrdencies regardrng the EU adminrstratron m
Mostar, rncludrng the WEU pohcc deplorment.
the first occasion rihcn WEU, tn carry/lng out an
operatron, *'as rmplemcntlng a decrsron of thc
Unron. In thrs contcxt, thcv also u,clcomed thc
fact that, for the first trme. the WEU and EU
Presidencres had carncd out a loint demarchc
rvhich contnbuted to the successful agrecment on
thc first phasc of thc unrfied pohce forcc N,lostar
(UPFM)"
32 On 23 Julv 1994. thc WEU mrssron
started *'rth Colonel Mor.p'ogel as the head of the
WEU Pohce Elemcnt Hc u'as also to become the
WEU Pohce Commrssroner rn Mostar untrl Julv
1995 Although a complement of 182 personncl
II
DOCUMENT I609
had bcen planned for, b1' June 1995 the mtsston
u'as strll at a strcngth of 151 personnel, from 9
membcr countrres. employrng 66 local staff It
took almost trvclve months to reach the target
numbcr of 182 personncl. after the Counctl's
dccrsron to allorv observers to particrpate as u'ell
Thc fact that the pohce force was not up to
strength until rvcll rnto the mISSlon meant that
manv of the scheduled and mandated tasks could
not be completcd rn the first vear of the mtsston
Of the WEU membcr states only Belgium sent no
contrngents The average composttron of the
WEU Police Element \!as as follorvs5.
Germany
Netherlands
France
Itall'
Sparn
Portugal
65 Sweden
20 Unrted Krngdom
20 Austna
20 Grecce
l0 Frnland
10 Luxcmbourg
10
8
7
7
3
2
33 Thc officers \\'ere supported by' an 80-
strong team of tnterpreters and 30 further local
staff. rvrth an attempt made alu'a1's to maintatn a
baiance rn the emplolment of east and u'est
Mostarrans At the end of March 1995. progress
u.as under u'av srth the srgnrng b1' all three par-
tres of an agreement on the tmplementatton of
phase I of the unificatron progrcss At this pornt,
aftc,r a presence of some erght months tn thc cttl',
WEU u,as finally tn a posttion to set about ful-
filhng rts tasks The next step \\'as to colrlmence
.lornt patrolhng of the Bulevar, the former con-
frontatron hne rn the Croat-Bosnlan conflrct.
Jornt patrollmg \\'as a utoptan goal at thrs stage.
so a haif-u'ay' house rr'as sought m combtned or
"mrrrored" patrolhng Thrs meant that east
Mostar police u'ould patrol the east stdc of the
Bulevar ri'rth WEU officers, lvhrlst thetr u'est
Mostar counterparts patrolled the u'est srde. also
ri'rth WEU offtcers lt u'as clear that small in-
cremental steps u'erc requrred to coax the two
conmunrtles torvards untficatton Combrned
patrols finall1'started rn June 1995
34 In Julv 1995 Colonel Megvogel completed
hrs missron rn Mostar and handcd over the;ob of
Commrssroner to Colonel Pteter Lambrechtsc.
also of the Ro1'al Dutch Marechaussee In Jull'
there uere contrnuous shelling attacks on Mostar
from the Bosnran Serb Arm1, and thc situatron
detenorated throughout August At the end of
' 
gna of trtlrrion Report. WEU
August, cast Mostar and WEU pohcc officers
\\ere surrounded at gunpornt bl' u'est Mostar of-
ficers on thc Bulevar, nght outstdc WEU Head-
quarters Thrs resulted tn east Mostar pohce
u,rthdrawrng from patrolhng thc Bulevar
WEU's hard rvork r,r'as bemg undcrmined by
local tensrons
35 In mid-September a signrficant break-
through rvas achieved b1' WEU pohce wrth the
srgning of phase 2 of thc UPFM process by all
partres Thrs provrded spectfically' for joint
patrols and recruttment and training of local
pohce forces. It rvas agreed that this phase rvould
be fully' tmplemcnted bv I March 1996. Hou'-
ever, carly' rn Fcbruary the securitl' situatron in
Mostar collapsed rvrth thc announccment by' the
EU Admrnrstrator of a neutral seventh zone, un-
der exclusrve EU authontv. lncorporating a sub-
stantral part of u'est Mostar's residenttal drstnct.
Almost rmmedrately'after the press conference, a
group of restdents surrounded the Admrnrstra-
tor's car for tu'o hours The crorvd then stormed
donn the Bulevar, smashrng up WEU vehtcles
and cars The WEU Pohce Element rvas unable
to prevent thrs mctdent Eventualll', the Bosnran-
Croat specral pohce mtervencd but the folloivrng
da1' all the w'est Mostar pohce lvere rvtthdraun
from WEU-UPFM functtons by their Com-
mander and communlcatlons rirth WEU and the
Admrnrstrator ceased.
36 Durrng the u,eeks that followed, the rnitta-
trves of the WEU Commtsstoner bore frurt *'ith
the arrrval of some I00 Croatian officcrs rn
Megugorle, read-"- to begtn u'ork monrtoring the
u'est Mostar poltcc and to asstst the unification
process On 20 Februarl'. 100 Bosnran pohce
also arnved from othcr areas of the Federatron
and the trvo forces unrted, undcr the command of
the WEU Police Commtsstoner, tn poltctng the
crty' In the last u'eek of Februarl' matters tm-
proved wrth the rmplemcntation of freedom of
movement All checkpolnts ln Mostar were re-
moved and barriers and barncades taken doun
37 Bi thc end of March, some 55 lvest
Mostar offrccrs and 64 from cast Mostar had
srgned UPFM contracts On29 March 1996 east
Mostar rcsrdcnts denred acccss to tx'o burral sites
rn Croat terrttory' staged a demonstration The
next da1'the group agarn tned to reach the sttcs
and WEU stepped rn to keep order and solve the
t2
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problem Eventually, a structured, escorted visrt
took place
38 By 19 Apnl thc Joint Hcadquarters \l,as
completed and the WEU Police Element moved
rn the next da1'. However, thc davs that follou,ed
brought another omlnous srgn, as a handful of
east Mostar offrcers took therr places, but the
west Mostar staff drd not turn up. At the same
trme, the EU Adminrstration made progress with
the opening of the Carinsky Bndge, the only
bridge providing a direct link betrveen the com-
munities of east and rvest Mostar With the de-
parture of Mr Koschnick rn April 1996, Mr
fucardo Perez Casado of Spain u'as appointed.
The date of electrons to the municipal councrl
was set for 3l May, but as May. dawned, the
electron was postponed to the end of June
39 Throughout the sprrng and early surrrmer
period, the WEU Police Personnel Department
continued recruting local offrcers for the UPFM
At the beginning of June, 100 officers from the
east and 70 from the west had signed therr con-
tracts. The future of the WEU missron seemed
strarghtfonvard. The enorrnous challenge of
marntammg pubhc securitv on election da),
rvould be followed shortly aftenvards b1, the
23 July end-of-mrssron date. The WEU Plannrng
Cell started to draw up plans for withdrawal and
also, under the Police Commrssroner's instruc-
trons. rnrtiated liarson rvrth the UN Intematronal
Policc Task Force
40 Electrons were scheduled for 30 June 1996
and the WEU police was rcsponsrble for pubhc
secuntl, plannrng for election dav. for sccuntv
for polling stations and for buses comrng rn from
far afield WEU harsed urth a number of other
bodics such as IFOR, the IPTF and the local
police to ensure that the dav went off smoothly
The operatron rn,ent extremell' well on the day
and WEU received manv congratulations on rts
role m Mostar's first elections slnce the armed
conflict had started When the EU's mandate for
Mostar expired on 23 July 1996. thc Presrdent of
the WEU Assembly urged the Councrl to extend
rt because the tasks had not vet bcen completed.
Admrnrstrative authonty was hou'cver trans-
ferred to a Croat mayor and his Muslim deput1..
A WEU Pohce Element u'as retamed as part of
the Joint Action, under the ausprces of thc neu'ly,-
formed Office of the EU Specral Envoy m
Mostar. Thrs force remained rn Mostar untrl mrd-
Octobcr, *'hen the WEU Council decrded to
transfcr authorrtv ovcr the pohce to the Mrnister
of thc Intenor on l5 October 1996
WI. Achievements and dfficulties
4l Throughout the duratron of the mrssion a
total of 500 officers served wrth the WEU Police
Element rn Mostar. The UPFM succeeded in set-
trng up a.loint police force of 209 officers, 132
from the Bosnran-controlled castern part of
Mostar and 77 from the Croat-controlled rvestern
part of the city The UPFM also contnbuted to
the smooth running of the munrcrpal electrons m
Mostar on 30 June 1996, the first elections to be
held in Bosnia and Herzegovtna slnce the srgnrng
of the Dayton Peacc Agreement ln December
1995 Horvever, the Pohce Elemcnt rvas not able
to protect the EU Admrnistrator u'hen he uas
attacked on 7 February 1996 by, a group of dem-
onstrators protestmg agamst hrs decrsron on the
drvisron of the munrcrpal cantons
42. Early rn thc mrssron there u'erc senous
problcms of mrsmatches of skills and responsr-
brlrtres. All spccrahsed or senror posts u'ere filled
b1, officers sent bv natronal governments for
career development purposes rather than on ac-
count of therr specral skrlls Inrtral trarning plans
proved unu'orkable o\\'lng to local police offrcers
constantlv berng sent on tour of duty to the front
Itncs and incessant personnel changes Further-
more. the lack of progress rn carrying out the
mandate made anv rnvcstment rn tralnlng unrnvit-
rng At the cnd of the mrssron, *hen the UPFM
camc lnto effcct. rt u'as too late to start an)'
rvorth*'hrlc tramrng schcdules It u'as decrded rn
surrrmer 1996 to redeplov officers desrgnated to
trainrng to othcr. more productn,e. posts
43 The fact that thc Pohce Element drd not
havc cocrclu'e po\\'ers at ttmes frustrated both the
officers and thc local populatron Accordrng to
Commrssroner Lambrechtse, crrcumstances rn
Mostar u'ere far from rdeal Thc local chrefs
u'ere the puppcts of their polrtrcal mastcrs. ri'hich
made some ncgotlatrons mcanrngless, as thel'
rvere reluctant to makc ccrtarn compromises
This uas parficularlv the casc on the Croat srde
A fundamental problem u'as that local negotia-
tions u'rth countetpart officers uere dependent on
the approval of polrtrcal supcnors. Bccause the
Fedcratron pohcc u'as dcccntrahsed to thc can-
tons, local authontres had a keen lntercst ln re-
l3
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tainrng control ovcr poltce forces Addrtronally,
there u'as a lack of organtsatton at nattonal level
so that rvhen key polrtrcal actors drd try to be
helpful. they rvere completely' frustrated b1'therr
own lack of control and the abscncc of communt-
catron Thrs farlure of organrsatton also mtrrored
the legal vacuum whrch the civtl war had created
There rvas a lawless soctety. rvhere even spectfic
rules of conduct for the local police w'ere lackmg.
Another important factor tn the negotratlons lvas
that Blue Zone boundarles \\'cre not congrucnt
rvrth pohce area boundaries. Local commanders
were understandably reluctant to formulate poli-
cies for the Blue Zone, which drffered from the
rest of their area of command. It also meant that
the UPFM, u'hen tt came lnto existence, became
a third force lvtth the remamtng tu'o structures
strll intact
44 Authonty over the local pohce command-
ers \\'as envrsaged in the mandate, but the polrtr-
cal srtuatron rendered thts tmposstble As a con-
sequence, an important element of the mandate
rvas not rmplemented rvhile there x'as constder-
able delay rn the tmplementatton of the other
elements Addrtronally, tnabtlttv to reach full
strength rn trme also rnhibrted the process The
mandate of the UPFM r,las stgntficantly rveak-
cned bv the lack of sanctions As a consequence,
WEU pohce suffcred someu'hat from hm-rted
po\\,ers of enforcement, breaches of agreement
and other provocatlons often u'ent unpuntshed,
even rf the perpetrator's identi[' u'as knoun A
future mandate should have the backrng of somc
form of sancttons
45 The rmmedrate legacl' of the WEU pohce
force rs that there Is no\\' an organtsattonal
structure for the neu' local pohce force. sup-
portcd bl' modern mfrastructure. rrtth a Jotnt
Headquarters (JHQ), Jomt control facrlrtres and
modern computer svstems The UPFM \\.as
effectrvcll' a blueprrnt for the Federatron pohce
w'hrch u'as to be uscd by the IPTF. u'hen rt took
over responsrbrlitv in October 1996
WII. The Internationsl Police Task Force(PrF)
46 After the srgrung of the Davton Peace
Agreement, the UN Secunty Councrl decrded to
estabhsh an Internattonal Pohce Task Force and
a Crvilian Officc for a perrod of one )car startmg
from the transfcr of authority from IINPROFOR
to IFOR6 The marn tasks of thls force, as sct out
rn Arurcx I I to the Dayton Peace Agreement,
rverc to monltor pohcc acttvtties and the func-
tlonlng of thc 
.;udrcral s)'stem, to promote the
creatron of a sccure and stable envtronment for
electrons rn Bosnta and to oversee the re-estab-
lishment of the Bosnian police forcc. The IPTF
and the Crvilian Offrce were subsequently
brought together under the title "trN Misston tn
Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)" Srnce the
IIN pohce officers rverc completely unarmed,
they rclied heavrly on the support and coopera-
tron of IFOR and later SFOR.
47 The IPTF established 64 stations through-
out the l0 cantons ofthe Federatton, tncluding a
regional headquarters rn the Neretva canton.
rvhich rncludes Mostar In thc first year of the
missron, the IPTF focuscd solell on frcedom of
movement rn the Federatron and a checkpoint
pohcy at the Inter Entttv Boundary Lme, between
the Federatron and Repubhka Srpska. In addi-
tron, the number of pohce offtcers u'as rcduced to
accepted intematlonal standards and offtcers
rvere sclected for prehmtnary tramlng It u'as not
untrl December 1991, rvhen the IPTF had
reachcd a strength of approxrmately 2 000
monltors, that the latter could start to focus on
thc pcrformance of thc nervly inaugurated pohce
serylces, and offer tralnrng courses for officers
and the rnspection of ucapons at police stattons.
An rmportant element of the UN pohcc restruc-
tunng poltcr u'as the deploy,nent of mtnoritl'
officers to arcas to s'hrch refugees and drsplaced
persons of that mrnorttl' were expccted to return
In addrtron. Serb officcrs \\'ere to be gradualll'
introduced tnto the cantons. uhere hardl)' an)'
were reprcsented The IPTF also started pohce
operatrons rn Brcko and Repubhka Srpska but
progress rn these areas \\'as ven' slou'
48 In December 1997, the first Federatton
Pohce Academl' r\as rnaugurated near Sara.;evo
and the IPTF rs to prcpare a curriculum rn line
ll'rth the norrns of democratrc poltcrng Rccentlv.
freedom of movcment has greatl)' improved
through the rntroductton of a colnmon car regls-
tratron plate rn February 1998, so that a car
o\ rler's ongrn ts no longer apparent on hls regis-
tratron plates
dtfN S""u.rn'Councrl Resolutron 1035. 2l Deccmber
1995
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49 The IPTF's mandate has been extcnded
untrl 2l June 19987, and over this period thc
main focus u'rll bc directed towards the return of
refugees, a prrorrtl' task for the rnternatronal
communrty In the Federatron there remarn only
two out of 10 cantons where the pohce force has
not yet been inauguratcd In cooperatron u'rth the
Crvihan Office, the IPTF had been pursumg a
comprehensive pohcy whereby reform of the
pohcc, prisons and ludicral system rs being car-
ned out rn integrated fashion The most diffrcult
task, however, has remained the restructuring
and trarrung of the pohce forces, owing mamlv to
drsputes between the partners.
IX. The IPTF in Mostar
50 When the IPTF took over WEU's respon-
srbrlrty rn October 1996, rt took stcps to disband
a number of Bosnian-Croat para-police forces
The Spccial Pohce Force in Mostar rvas drs-
banded, along with groups of armed civihan
security guards Hou'ever, in Februar1, 1997.
senous vrolence erupted in Mostar betrveen
Mushms and Croats The Croats opened fire on a
group of some 200 Mushms attempting to travel
from the mainly Croat-controlled area of the city
to a gravevard in a Muslim-controlled sector At
least one Muslim was killed and some 30 others
\\'ere ln1ured. Following the shootrngs. Croats
reportedly' cvrctcd a number of Mushm famrhes
from the Croat-domrnated u'est srde of the crtv
Thrs mcrdent resulted rn thc collapse of the unr-
fied Mushm-Croat pohcc force m the crty. rvith
each srde retreatrng behrnd lts respcctlve ethnrc
bastrons The IPTF managed to broker an
agreement betu'cen them to reinstatc a ;omt
pohce force.
5l The reorganrsatron and tramrng of thc
pohce remarns a drfficult task for the IPTF.
especrallf in Mostar. In hrs report to the IIN
Securrty Councrl. Secretary-General Kofi Annan
shows his as'areness of these problems u'hen he
states that. "The continued existence of unofficral
separate, ethnrcallv-based chams of command rn
these cantons has rmpeded cooperation bctu'een
Croat and Bosrua pohce officers in.lornt mvesti-
gatrons of ethnrcalll' motivated cnmes, such as
house bumings in areas of minorrty retum In
addrtron, some munlcipalitres in these cantons,
7UN S."u"[,Councrl Resolulon 1144, 19 Deccmbcr
1997
u'hrch are dommatcd by onc cthnrc group. have
rcverted to a pattcrn of pohce patrols b1' the
dommant group onll' Both these dcvclopments
demonstrate thc contrnurng necd for close monr-
torrng of the Iocal pohce 8"
X. Conclusions
52 The Davton Peacc Agreement brought
peace to Bosrua and Hcrzegovrna but much re-
mams to be done before the regron returns to
normal hfe. rvithout hostrlities The task of re-
structuring the pohce forces rs a complex and
trme-consumlng one and requires a greal deal of
manpower to achievc it More action wrll be
needed, to burld a pohcc force lvhrch wrll operate
accordrng to dcmocratrc principles and human
nghts, especialll' nou' that the return of refugees
and drsplaccd pcrsons ls a promrnent rssue for
the mternatronal communrty' In Recommendation
619, the WEU Assembly drerv thc Councrl's at-
tcntlon to the need to estabhsh a WEU pohce
force to help and rn the long run possrbll' replacc
the IPTF. Among other thrngs. the recommenda-
tron stated
" Notrng that the re-estabhshment of the
rule of lau rn Bosnra and Herzegovrna
urth the help of the IPTF rs essential rf the
Dayton peacc agrcement rs to have lastrng
effect:
Convrnced that the IPTF could implement
rts mandatc even more effectrvelv rvrth the
assrstance of a substantial. addrtronal unrt
of u'ell-trarned, rvell-equrpped and exper-
renced pohce officers from WEU coun-
trtes. draurng on the expenence of carher
operatlons 
- 
ln partlcular the task force rn
Mostar. the Danubc cmbargo operatron
and the contrnurng work of the Multr-
nattonal Advrson' Pohcc Elemcnt (MAPE)
in Albanra.
Notrng that such a unit from WEU coun-
tnes should be able to continuc rts task
undcr WEU command rf, for financtal or
other reasons. the Unrted Natrons decrded
not to prolong the mandate of the IPTF;"
This requrrement strll holds good toda1, srnce a
good dcal of rvork remains to be done and IPTF
manpo\\'er ma)' not be sufficrent to fulfil the
comprehensrvc tasks lvrng ahead By' establishing
-g 
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thrs much-nceded pohcc forcc. WEU could cn-
hance rts vrsrbrlrty, and makc an extremely uscful
contnbutlon to European crrsis managcmcnt
53. Thc Assemblv also made clear rn Rccom-
mcndatron 620 that "WEU rs first and foremost a
polrtrco-mrlrtan' organrsatron and that rts cnsis-
managcment actrvltles can under no clrcum-
stances be confincd to pohcc actrvities" Nevcr-
theless, a )'car aftcr thc police operatlon ln
Mostar. WEU w'as rn fact carr),rng out another
police operatron
Part III 
- 
Albania
I. Background to WEU's police operation
in Albania
54 After vears of berng governed b1' an auto-
cratrc regime and rsolated from the u'orld.
Albanra. onc of thc poorest countries in Europc.
adopted a democratrc constltutlon rn l99l Its
!'ery poor economv drd not adapt casrlv and rt
became rncreasrnglv enmeshcd in black market
actrvrtres, especrallv aftcr sanctrons \\'ere lm-
posed on the Federal Repubhc of Yugoslavra
(Scrbra and Montenegro). P1'ramrd finance
schemes burgeoncd rn thrs depressed economlc
cirmate, promrsmg largc rcturns on rn!'cstments
Peace rn Bosnra. and hence thc endrng of sanc-
trons, sel'crelr affectcd the pvramrd schemcs,
u'hrch had accumulatcd large amounts of artrfi-
cral garns The government was unequal to ad-
dressrng the countn's basrc economlc problems
- 
a srtuatron rvhrch led to political rnstabrlrty'
among the populatron and the opposrtion partres
In carlv March. Parhamcnt declared a state of
emcrgencv and secuntv forces w'cre allou'ed to
open fire on crouds at random Presrdent Bcnsha
rmposed a curfeu and stated that anv armed per-
son u'ould be shot on srght rf unable to shou'
genurne identrtr papcrs
-55 The parhamentan' electrons of March
1992 had provrded the Democratrc Part1, rvith a
clear ma.lorrtv In Mar, 1996, general electrons
u'ere held uhrch agarn brought vrcton, to Presr-
dent Bensha's Democratrc Partl', but under er-
tremell' dubrous clrcumstances The opposrtron
called for furthcr elcctrons but Presrdent Berrsha
hung on and barred all opposrtron partrcs from
pubhc life Polrtrcal and socral rnstabilrty reached
rts herght rn carlv 1997 nrth the collapse of thc
pvramrd finance schemcs Already, at thc cnd of
1996, the World Bank and thc IMF had u'arned
thc Albanran Govcrnmcnt of the huge nsks in-
volvcd rn pvramrd schcmcs. but the Government
rnrtrallv refrarncd from takrng any'spccrfic actron
Frnally. on 23 Januan l997. under strong pres-
sure from rnternatlonal fund provrders, the AI-
baruan Parhament dccrded to outlas' the
schemes Whcn the schcmcs collapsed many Al-
banians, u'ho had invested a total estrmatcd
amount of US$l brlhon. u'ere left u'rth substan-
tral losses When rt became clear to Albanrans
that there rvas lrttlc chance that the1, rvould be
fully compensated for therr losses, rvrdespread
riotrng and armed clashes broke out, especrally, rn
the southcrn part of Albanra, u'hich the police
rvere unable to contarn Cnmrnal gangs serzed the
opportunrtv to takc control of a vast amount of
\\'eaponry stolen from pohce stations (and arrna-
ments depots) At the end of March a thrrd of
Albania was ln the hands of self-defence commrt-
tees and a mass exodus u'as takrng place to Itall'
and Greece Thc Govcrnment $as unable to rc-
storc lau' and order or contain civrl strrfe. rn
u'hrch an estrmatcd I 500 to 2 000 people \\'ere
killed After medratron by the OSCE and the
Europcan Unron, the Albanran Presrdent agrecd
that a nc*' Govemment composed of representa-
tn'es of all the marn polrtrcal partres should be
s\4'orn rn and a new Pnme Mmrster. Baskim
Fino. belongrng to thc socrahst oppositron party.
was appornted.
56 Prime Mrnrster Frno rmmediatelv appealed
for forcrgn mrlrtary lnten'entlon to restore order
and argucd for the deplovrnent of a NATO
peacekeeprng force Hou'evcr. there u'as irttle
enthusrasm for mrlrtan' rntcrvcntlon among the
member states The European Unron could not
agrec on a mrlrtan' mlssron erthcr, becausc of
reslstance on the part of some member states, ln
partrcular the Unrtcd Krngdom. and eventually
agrecd to drspatch a mrlitan' and police
"advtson' force" to hclp the neu' government re-
store order Tu'o WEU Planning Ccll officers
partrcrpated rn a fact-findmg mrssron u'hrch vrs-
rtcd Albanra rn mrd- and late Marche.
51 Eventuallr'. the OSCE decided to act by
allou'rng a "coalrtron of thc rvilhng", undcr thc
leadershrp of Italr'. to bc sent to Albanra Bcfore
dcplorment could begrn. IIN Security' Councrl
approval $'as sought, at the rnstrgation of certaln
I6
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countnes, and was glven on 28 Marchro The
Councrl concluded that the situatron rn Albania
was a threat to peace and sccunty rn the regron,
allowing Chapter VII of the Charter to bc rn-
voked Thc operation's mandate, horvevcr, was
hmitcd to facilrtate the safe and prompt dehvery
of humanrtarian asslstance, and to help create a
secure environment for the missrons of interna-
ttonal organisatrons rn Albanra, including those
provrdrng humanitarian assrstance In addrtron,
the LD,l force in Macedonra (LINPREDEP) w'as
mamtarned despitc rnrtral rvithdrau'al plans, to
prevent the cnsis sprcading. UNPREDEP's
mandate rvas extended for a further srx months to
October 1997, after u,hrch the force rvould
gradually be lvrthdraun". In mid-Aprrl, the Ital-
tan-led Operatron Alba began rvith a force of
2 000 men Its final strength u'as 7 000 men rvrth
ten European countnes partrcrpating rn the mrs-
sionl2
58 The Austnan Chancellor. Franz
Vranrtzkl', u'ho had led several OSCE missrons
to Albanra, managed to brokcr a contract bet-
\\'een government partles to hold general elections
to the People's Assembll, on 29 June 1997. The
electrons. monitored by, Operatron Alba and 500
OSCE observers, resulted in the defeat of Ber-
rsha's ruling Democratrc Party (PDS) at thc
hands of the Socrahst Party of Albanra (PSS)
Fatos Nano (PSS) bccame the Primc Mmrster of
the ncu'government, and PSS Secretarv-Gencral
Rexhep Medlani u'as elected to be the nerv Al-
banran Presrdent Srnce thcn the srtuatron has
remarned unstable rvrth Mr Bensha bol'cottrng
the Assemblv and organlslng numerous demon-
stratrons against Mr Nano's govemment. Al-
though Operatron Alba u'as supposed to bc rvrth-
draum m June, the force remarned rn Albania
unttl Augusl 1997, at the rnstrgatron of Chancel-
lor Vranrtzky, u'ho in fact u'antcd the forcc to be
placed under EU command after June, an rdea
not taken up by,the EU Operatron Alba has been
crrticrsed for the limrted nature of rts mandate,
under rvhrch troops could do nothing to drsarm
the gangs and stop thc violencc rn the countn'.
but it has had the great ment of savrng the coun-
try from a further shde into anarchy, and of creat-
m Utf Sou.,ty Councrl Resolutron ll0l, 28 March
1997
rr IIN Secunq'Councrl Resolu[on 1105,9 Apnl 1997
12 Austna, Bclgrum, Denmark, Spain. Greece. Italy,
Portugal. Romama. Sloverua and Turkey'
rng stabrlrtl' for thc holdrng of electrons u'hrch
Councrl of Europc obscrvers callcd "adequatc
and acceptable at thrs stage" In Novcmbcr 1991
the Albanran Mrnrstcr of the Intenor. Nerrtan
Ceka, rndrcated that of thc one mrliron \\eapons
stolen, onli' 10% had bcen handed rnr3
II. llEU action 
- 
a fact-linding mission
59 The WEU Assembll''s Standrng Commrt-
tee, meetlng rn Athcns on 3 March 1997. unanr-
mously adopted Recommendatron 609 rcquestrng
the WEU Councrl to "Morutor verv closelv the
development of the srtuatron rn Albania rn order
to be prepared to act if requested to do so,
[and] ask the WEU Plannrng Cell to drau, up
contmgencv plans for possrble operations rn Al-
banra coverrng the u'hole range of Petersberg
operations from humanltanan and rescue tasks to
peacekecping tasks and peacemakrng, includrng
control over the rcstrtutron of arms and munr-
trons" On 14 March thc WEU Councrl. con-
vencd at the rcquest of the French Presrdency'.
expressed rts conccrn at the vrolent unrest but
refrained from proposlng an\r concrete actlon,
desprte the fact that the crisrs rn Albania lar. x'ell
rvrthin the capabrlrties spccrficd for Pctersberg
tasks. Thrs prompted WEU's Secrctary,-General,
Jose Cutrlerro, to dcscrrbe the Albanran cnsrs as
"a missed chance" for thc Organrsatron
60 The decision not to rntervenc also led to
controversv at the headquarters of Eurofor, the
European Raprd Deploymcnt Force dcsrgncd for
use for European mlsslons Although Eurofor
$'as not to bccome opcratronal untrl Octobcr
1997. offrcers felt rt mrght have bcen more effec-
trve rn deahng u'rth a multinatronal mrssron than
natronal mrlrtan' staf o
61. As a result of the fact-findrng mrssron to
Albanra in March rn w'hrch tr.vo WEU Plannrng
Cell officers partlctpated. thc Polrtrco-Nfilrtan
Group (PMG) rvas tasked on 10 Apnl rirth a
studl' of the experrence acqurred bv WEU dunng
the pohce opcration rn Mostar to see horr a mul-
tinational advrson' clcment rn Albanra could be
set up qurckly,. In mrd-Apnl the WEU Councrl
adopted a proposal from the French Presrdeno
to send another fact-findrng mlsslon to Albanra to
studv the practical arrangemcnts for a pohcc ad-
n 
.rtsrre Frrnce Pres.se.2 November 1997
''t De1e,rt, .\'ews. 7-13 Apnl, 1997 ''WEU spums
Albarua but promrses fururc humanilrnar tasks"
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vlsor], clomcnt to help the Albanran authonttes
reconstltute pohce forces Thrs fact-findrng mrs-
sron, compnsrng reprcscntatrl'es from WEU. the
OSCE and thc Councrl of Europe. vrsrted Trrana
from 23-25 Apnl Dunng thc negotratrons rvrth
thc Albanran authontres, specral emphasrs u'as
put on advrcc on the reorganlsatlon and restruc-
turmg of Albanran police forccs Dunng AIba-
nla's transrtron from corrrmunrst to dcmocratrc
state, thc police forces had fallen rnto a state of
scvere drsarray', and neivly'-recrurtcd officers re-
cerved onlv hmrtcd trarnrng. Furthermore, on ac-
count of therr lou' \\'ages, manv officers werc
prone to corruptron or had left the force durmg
the crisrs. u'hrch madc restructunng of the pohce
force a hrgh pnontl, for the Albanran Govern-
ment
III. Preparations for the deployment of the
Mu ltination al Advisorl, Police E lement
(MAPE)
62 After the rcturn of the fact-findmg mrs-
sron. the WEU Permanent Councrl decrded on
2 Ma1' 1997 lo sct up a Multrnatronal Advison'
Pohce Element (MAPE) to provrde assrstance to
the Albanran pohce MAPE u'ould grvc the Al-
banran pohce authontres the necessan' rnforma-
tron and advrcc on appropriate aspects of pohc-
rng and rcstormg order ln addrtron. rt u'ould
traln lnstructors ln the fields of organrsatron,
pubhc order. monrtonng of bordcrs. logrstrcs and
communlcatlons Bccause of the precanous se-
cuntv srtuatlon ln Albanra. MAPE u'ould not
take part rn spccrfic pohcc operatrons
63 In order to prcparc MAPE's dcplolmcnt.
an advance partv u'as drspatched to Albanra.
headcd by'the French Colonel. Grlles Janvrer, as
Head of the Partv The tasks of the Advance
Partv rncluded the estabhshment of harsons x'rth
thc Albanran pohce and the relevant authorrtres,
contacts rvrth other mrssrons rn Albanra, the
preparatlon of a Memorandum of Understandrng
rrrth the Albanran Government and assessment of
the overall requlrements for MAPE's main ele-
ment. Drscussrons on MAPE had rn the mcantrme
been enlarged to 28 countrles. uhrch enabled the
assoclatc partncrs to be rnvolved as well
64 On thc basrs of the conclusrons of thc Ad-
vance Parh'. the WEU Plannrng Cell prepared
the dcplormcnt of the marn clement It rvas dc-
crded that MAPE u'ould be deplovcd for a penod
of thrcc months. from 12 Ma1, to 12 August
1997, n Trrana. Durrcs and other safe areas rn
Albanra MAPE consrstcd of rts Head. thc Dep-
utv and four senror adv'rsors. allocated to the
branches responsrble for organrsatron. pubhc
ordcr. border pohcrng and Iogrstrcs ln addrtron,
each senror advrsor had a small team of pohce
officers at his drsposal for carrvrng out a specrfic
task
65 The Rules of Engagemcnt whrch had been
used m Mostar served as a model for thc opera-
tron rn Albania MAPE mcmbers rvere allowed to
carr1, prstols for use in self-defence. A Memo-
randum of Understandrng rvrth the Albanian
authontres, among othcr thrngs lal'ing doun the
proccdures for clarms and for the settlement of
drsputes betu'een MAPE and the Albanian
authontres, rvas to be thc basrs for MAPE's dc-
ploy,mcnt After a rather lengthy negotlatlon
proccss, the MoU u'as signed on 24 June 1997
IV. MAPE's short-term programme
66 The short-terrn prograrrrme drd not start
untrl July', due to thc latc srgnature of the Memo-
randum of Understanding The programme
started u'ith a total of 24 personncl from 14
member countries. rncludrng, for thc first time.
all categories of WEU partlcrpants So far, 20
countnes have decrded to send personnel's
MAPE rs thc first opcratron drrected b1'the WEU
Councrl u,rth the support of the Plannrng Cell
Togethcr u'rth thc logrstrcal arrangements, the
maln aspccts of the short-tcrm prograrnme were
advice and trarnrng
67 Advce N{APE provrded the Albanran
pohcc u'rth advrce relatrng to the general elec-
trons rrhrch u'ere to take place rmmedratelv after
MAPE's dcplorment Thrs resulted rn a general
code of conduct for the Albanian pohce dunng
the clectrons. for u'hrch MAPE drd not provtdc
operatronal support on the ground MAPE also
advrsed thc Albanran authoritres on the restruc-
tunng of the pohce force and the reorganrsatron
of the Mrnrstrl'of the Intenor
68 Trarrung MAPE made use of a "trarn the
trarners'' approach. rn rvhrch rt preparcd lnstruc-
tors to trarn therr oun pohcc officers, thus creat-
l. Nrn. firll members (except Belgrum) and Norway,
Turkel', Denmark. Frnland, Srveden, Bu.lgana, Estorua,
Latua. Poland , Romanra and Sloverua
l8
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rng a multipher cffect Courses were run on
patrol organrsation, checkpoint and community
policing and pubhc order. The programmes foc-
uscd on the pohcc code of conduct, human rights
and human dignrty, all areas rn which the Alba-
ruan pohce had a very bad record An addrtional
trarnlng programme was established for the
Trrana Police Directorate, in whrch training was
grven on road security and patrols, rntervention
operatrons and the collectron of weapons. An-
other pnority rvas the Police Academy in Tirana,
for which MAPE developed a trarning syllabus
and sent two tralncrs to retrain the academy, in-
structors.
V. Extension of the mandate
69 An extensron of MAPE's mandate seemed
necessary because of the delal,s encountered in
startrng the short-term programme. The Planning
Cell came to the conclusron that trarnrng should
at least contrnue untrl October 1997 and that,
srmultaneously', a trmetable should be drawn up
for a long-terrn programme On l8 July the WEU
Council decided to prolong MAPE's mandate for
an addrtional tu,o months from 12 August to
12 October 1997 and appointed French Colonel
Fredenc Denis as Head of the Mrssron
70 During that perrod, the Albanran Prime
Minister, Fatos Nano, vrsrted WEU Headquar-
ters and expressed his gratrtude for MAPE's as-
srstance to the Albanian police He stressed the
determrnation of the Albanran Government to
carry out restructunng and modernlsation of its
pohce forces and requested contmued WEU as-
srstance to the Albanran police MAPE's excel-
lent cooperatron rvrth the Albanran authontres
u'as deeply appreciated
7l During the rnrtral phase, MAPE managed
to traln some 100 Albanran police officers be-
longing to the Rapid Reaction Forces and Com-
missariats in Trrana, wrth basrc trarnrng m bor-
der pohcrng Just startlng m funas. Although the
2-3 rveek courses were much apprecrated b1'the
particrpants. there seemed to be somc factors
hmrting the rmpact of the "tram the trarners" ap-
proach. These included the short trme avarlable,
the lack of basrc skills among the Albanian offi-
cers, the small numbers of tratners berng trained
and rnstabrlrty rvrthm the management of the Al-
banian pohce. A shift rn the approach tow'ards
tramrng acttvltlcs lvas ngcessary, rn order to boost
MAPE's cffectrvcncss rn the near future
W. The longlerm programme
72. The concept for the long-term prograrnme
had been developed b1, thc Plannrng Cell and the
WEU Presrdcncy and u,as to be implemented in
accordance rvith three cnteria The first \!'as a
step-by-step approach, according to which ac-
trvitics were to be built up gradually over time
The second \,\,as the prrncrple of sustainabrlrtr,,
implying a gradual transfer of responsrbrlrty to
the Albanians themselves. The third crrtena was
cooperatron with other states and orgarusations in
Albania After examrnrng thrs concept, the WEU
Councrl decrdcd to extend MAPE's mandate for
a further 6 months from 12 October 1997 to
12 April 1998, rvrth the possrbrlrty of further
extensions afterwards Thrs extensron, and the
adoptron of the long-term programmc. was ac-
companred bv an rncrease ln pcrsonnel from 25
to no more than roughll' 60, wrth the optron of an
rncrease to 90 at a later date The programme
was drvided rnto five parts. advlce, basrc trarn-
ing, speciahsed trarnrng, evaluatron and cqutp-
ment and logrstrc support
73 Advce In MAPE II strong emphasrs rs
being put on the provrsion of advrce to the Alba-
ruan authonties, but this urll only bc possrble rf
there is a clear conceptlon on the part of the Al-
banian pohce of thc prrontres and goals of the
restructunng phase MAPE u'ould therefore
contnbute to the devclopment of an overall pohcc
concept in close cooperatlon wrth the Mrnrstrl of
the Intenor. rvhrch has allou'ed scveral delega-
tions to set up advrsory' offices rn the Mrnistry
At present, Greece, Itall', the Unrted States and
MAPE have offrces rn the Mrnrstn'. rvrth MAPE
havrng a coordinating role m ordcr to centrahse
advice to the Albanran authontres
74 Basrc trarrung Because of the lack of
basrc pohcrng skrlls among thc Albanian officers.
the "train the trainers" approach seemed to havc
no more than a limited impact rn the short term
Therefore. rt u,as decrded that a basrc trarnrng
programme rvas to be conducted to teach thc Al-
banian pohce the basrc skrlls, in parallel ri'ith the
"train the trarners" actrvrtrcs The courses rvould
be conductcd rn c,vcles of three months and
u'ould focus on rssucs such as human rrghts 
- 
in
whrch experts from thc Councrl of Europe u'ere
l9
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involved as u'cll 
- 
profcsstonal ethrcs and human
drgnrty and larv enforcement rn con;unctton urth
a pohce code of conduct Albanran partlclpants
were sclected accordrng to a screcnmg process
conducted bv the Albanran authonttes and
MAPE Eventually', five courses u.tth approxt-
mately 30 students on each w'ere draun up and
were designed to run in parallel, u'hrch u'ould
enable some 300 pohce to be trained b1' l2 Aprrl
1998. the end of MAPE's mandate Thc first
trarning centre opened in Ttrana tn November
I997 and a second, rn Durres, rs expected to be-
come avarlable in June 1998, u'ith fundrng from
the Europcan Commtssion.
75 Speuahsed tratrung. Apart from basrc
trarning. specrahsed tramrng might be necessary
in the fields of border policrng and sccne-of-
cnme rnvestlgatlon. dependrng on thc results of
the basrc trarnrng courses Thrs also tncludes a
"trarn the trarners" programme to enable the Al-
banian pohce to gradually' take ovcr responstbtl-
rtv In the field of specrahsed trarnrng, close co-
ordrnatron u'rth other organrsatrons and mtssrons
r.rrll be necessar], slnce MAPE u'tll not bc tn a
positron to offer a fulI rangc of spcctaltsed
courses.
76 Evaluatron Dunng MAPE I. monrtonng
of the results of the trarnrng courscs rr as not part
of MAPE's actn'rtres. but the need to o'aluate
the performance of the local pohcc \\'as nccessan'
in order to assess the rmpact of MAPE's actrvl-
tres It q'as recommended that after the first
three-month trarnrng cycle. srx evaluatron teams
rrould be drspatchcd around the countn'to sec
u'hether the trarnrng recerved u'as berng put lnto
practrce
77 l:'qurpment and logrstrc support The EU
plaved a vrtal rolc rn the field of Iogrstrcs The
European Commrssron had devcloped a PHARE
prograrnme through u'hrch a total of 4 8 mrlhon
ecu \\'ere allocated to the reform of the Albanran
police In the rnitral phasc this compnsed reparrs
to l8 pohce statlons destrol,ed rn the nots and the
financrng of the first pohce trarnrng centre rn
Trrana MAPE had its o\\n equrpment allocatron-
but it x'orked closell, wrth the European Com-
mrssion to dcvelop a coherent and comprehensrve
equipment programme All EU fundrng had to bc
of drrect benefit to the Albanrans, so all PHARE
equrpment used for the trainrng prograrnme or
othcr actrvrtres rvrll be handcd over to thc Alba-
nrans at thc end of the mtssron WEU cqulpment
u,rll crther be passed on to them or urll be used
for future WEU opcratrons
VII. Conclusions
78 At the trme of unting, 6l WEU officers
are deplol'ed rn Albanra and thrs number wrll
need to be rncreased over the comlng months To
date, MAPE has managed to trarn some 300 offi-
ccrs, rvrth addrtronal courses for 30 officers hav-
ing started m Novcmber 1997. A total of somc
600 to 700 Albanran officers are berng trained at
the moment A number of evaluatron teams have
been drspatched around Albanra to evaluate the
progress achleved durrng the first phase of
MAPE's mlsslon In addrtron to the tramtng
centres rn Trrana and tn Durres. the latter of
u'hrch ri'rll be avarlablc b1, June, there are plans
to open t$'o more trainrng centres rn the north
and south of Albanra. also to be funded bv the
EU
79 MAPE ma1' be considered unrque rn the
sense that for the first trme all categories of
WEU members u'ere able to partrcrpate rn the
mlsslon 20 countnes rn fact took advantage of
that opportunrtv In addrtron, MAPE rr'as the first
operatron trulr' run bi thc WEU Council rn Brus-
sels. rvrth thc support of thc Planning Ccll. and tn
close coordrnatron rvrth the European Unton
80 On 8 Aprrl 1998 the Councrl decrded to
cxtcnd MAPE's mandate for a furthcr trvelve
months. untrl 12 Aprrl 1999, u'tth a mrd-term
revre\\' rn October 1998 The pnorttv dunng thrs
perrod u,rll be transfcr of responsrbilitl to the
Albanrans themsclr,cs, thus tmplvtng total rntc-
gratlon of rnternatronally accepted standards rnto
the Albanran poircc doctrtnc. The stages of
MAPE's rnvoh'emcnt rvrll be linkcd to the prog-
ress madc b1' the Albanrans themselves (the so-
callcd condrtronality pnncrple) and MAPE's o\\l
strength rs to be burlt up rn parallel u'tth those
stages. to a maxtmum of 107 pcrsonnel MAPE's
dcployment has been extended be1'ond Trrana to
rnclude Durres. u'here addrtronal basic trarnrng
and "tram the trarners" courses urll be provrded
Thcrefore. MAPE urll dcvelop staged targets for
actn'rtres to bc completed. provrde a basts for thc
dccrsron on the handover of tasks to the Alban-
rans and define standards to bc achteved b1 them
To altam that goal MAPE urll also focus on
managcment trarnrng and specraltsed tratntng, to
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complemcnt other natronal and rnstrtutronal pro-
grammes In the framervork of the PHARE pro-
grarrune WEU ri,rll contlnue to cooperate closelv
wrth the EU and jornt mectmgs of WEU and EU
rvorking groups dealing xrth Albanra wrll be held
whenever appropriate
81. Italy has proposed a numbcr of condrtrons
for the extensron of MAPE's mandate MAPE's
command, held by a French officer, should be-
come collegial and Itahans should hold more
posts of responsrbrlrty in MAPE's organisatron
Additionally, Italy wants to expand MAPE's
mandate initrally only' for a perrod of tu,o
monthsr6. Ou,rng to lts geographrc location, Italv
has set up numerous brlateral programmes tn
Albanra, but seems morc inclined to go rt alone
rather than operate ri'rthin MAPE.
82 MAPE strll depends on other contnbutrng
missions to carry out all the tasks in Albania,
especially, as far as the speciahsed trainrng
courses are concerned The United Kingdom and
Italy are provrding courses m border pohcing and
the Unrted States has set up rts own missron rn
Albarua, the Internatronal Crrminal Investigatrve
Trammg Assrstance Programme (ICITAP) Fir,'e
offrcers have been drspatched to Tirana and are
focusrng on the developmcnt of a long-terrn cur-
rrculum and trarnmg prograrrrme, in cooperatron
rvrth MAPE The US rntends to set up trarrung
courses on controlhng crvrhan upnsrngs, some-
thing MAPE uas not able to offer, and x,ill do-
nate US$ 2 5 mrlhon durrng the coming vear
The ultrmate goal rs to bring all natronal mrtra-
tives under MAPE's umbrella, and for the lattcr
to have a coordrnatrng role.
83 A great deal remams to be done for MAPE
and the natronal mrssions as the srtuatron in Al-
banra conlnues to be unstablc A number of
gangs still opcrate u'ithrn the countn,. krlhng rn-
nocent people, and the badll'-paid pohce are re-
putedly too frightened and demoraliscd to go af-
ter the crimrnals In February 1998, an armed
gang took control of the northern torm of
Shkoder, Berrsha's pou'erbase. after rvhrch the
local pohce forcc, numbenng 600 offrcers, fled
the crty and thc raprd action force of the Alba-
nran arrny had to be brought in. in order to regarn
control. Over the past srx months somc 50
policemcn have been krlled in skirmrshes *'rth
*l1gg*u I.ronce Presse,8 Apnl 1998
crrminals, resultrng ln a lalv bcrng passcd
authorisrng thc pohcc to opcn fire on cnminal
gangs u'ithout u'arnrng Presrdent Medlanr has
callcd 1998 the Year of thg Constrtution. u,hcn
thc OSCE, the Councrl of Europe and the Euro-
pean Parliament are to partlclpate rn the draftrng
of a nerv constitutron for Albanra, much necded
m order to provide a basrs for the restoratron of
public order and the reform of the army and thc
police.
84 Wrth the help of the intemational com-
munity a number of p1'ramrd finance schcmes
have started compensatmg Albanrans rvho havc
suffered financral loss. but the overall economrc
srtuatron in Albania rs still poor Inflation rs ver)'
hrgh and taxes havc just been rarsed from 12 to
20o/o. Apart from thc cconomrc cnsrs, the polrtr-
cal stalemate betu'ecn Mr Nano's government
and the opposrtion undcr Mr Berrsha contrnues,
u'rth the latter sometimes revoltrng against the
government from hls various powcr bases around
the country,. Clearlr'. Albanra can onlv succeed in
re-estabhshing larv and order with thc help of the
intematronal communrty For this reason Alba-
nia's Dcputl' Defence Mmrster has argucd for a
UN morutoring force to bc deplol'cd as rn neigh-
bouring FYROM. x'here some 750 soldrcrs are
stattoned along thc border n'rth the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavra and Albania as a preventlvc
mcasure to defuse tensrons in the regroniT
85 NATO has offered Albanra an indvidual
Partnershrp for Peace programme, formallv es-
tablrshcd rn September 1997 Thrs consrsts of
threc elements hclp urth restructunng Albanra's
armcd forces, storage and handhng of ammunr-
tron and dcvelopment of a natronal secuntv and
dofence conccpt Thc Albanian Govcrnment has
made vanous rcqucsts for deplol'ment of a
NATO force to guard the border urth Kosovo
Prrme Minrster Nano is afraid that rf Presrdcnt
Mtlosevrc pursues a pohcv of ethnrc cleansrng of
Albanrans m Kosovo. rcfugces u'rll flee torvards
Albanra and FYROM, u'here they mav not bc
able to rntegratc u'rth thc other Albanran groups,
thus tnggenng anothcr \\'ar rn thc Balkans In
addttron, the Albanran arrn\,. conslstlng of
l5 000 ri'holly undcr-cqurppcd troops. rvould not
be ablc to resist the Serb ur*v't NATO \\'as not
n lrtrlnot,rnal Herolcl Trhune, 12 March. 1998,
"NATO to send more ard to Albanra but no troops".
18 Lc Jv{r,nde.7 April 1998
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howcver prepared to send troops, 3udgrng thrs
premature, but rnstead decrded to send specraltst
advrsers to assrst the Albanrans guard their bor-
der wrth the Federal Republrc of Yugoslavra,
u,here only 200 Albanran guards are deployed,
and to advrse on the handhng of refugees from
Kosovo'e. Mr Nano drd succecd rn hrs rcquest for
an cxtension of the LINPREDEP mandate tn
FYROM, which the Secuntv Councrl decrded to
extend trll the end of August 1998
86. WEU too was not prepared to send forces
to Albanra, but WEU's role m Albania. albert
more marginal, rs not yet over At the moment
France, Italy and Germany, are the brggest con-
tnbutors to MAPE, each with 15 offrcers de-
ployed, but MAPE urll need more assrstance and
manpo\\'er to carry out its tasks in Albanra and
u'ould deeply appreclate more brlateral rnrtrativcs
and increased partrcipation from WEU mcmber
states
General conclusions
87 The various pohce operatrons drscussed tn
the present report have helped WEU to garn ex-
penence in this field. Each of these operatrons
was of an entirely drffercnt t1pe, as requrred b1
the specrfic circumstances. What thel' had rn
corrrmon was that rvell-trarned and experienced
police forces from WEU countnes put therr own
knoil'-how at the drsposal of local pohce forces
rvhrch lacked the specific knouledge or back-
ground to cope rrrth a cnsrs situatron
88 In a European secunt)' envlronment rrhich
ln certaln reglons has not yet stabrhsed. there rrrll
no doubt be more demands for operatrons b1'
specral pohce forces rn the foreseeablc futurc
Thc decrsron to rncludc specral poltce forces rn
thc follou,-on SFOR dcmonstrates that such
forccs can provrde the mrssrng hnk betu,een
mrlrtary forces and local pohce ln sltuatlons
where the local pohcc arc unable to protect the
populatron and ensure a suffrcient level of secu-
nty' Marntenance of pubhc order, not control
and the fight agarnst tcrronsm are tasks rvhrch
demand a great deal of specific trammg and
knou'ledge and thcsc arc not usually undertakcn
bv mrlitarl' forces or basic police forces.
89. Little u'as knoun about thrs new require-
ment for a ''third force" when the Petersberg
Declaratron of 1992 was adopted, A doctrrne for
lnternatlonal police operatlons still needs to be
cstabhshed and such opcratrons may have to be
rncorporated formalh'rn the tnventory of possrble
WEU opcratrons, even though rt has been sug-
gested that WEU rs a defcnce organlsatlon u'hrch
rs not supposed to mount pohce operatrons lf
WEU decrdcs to deplov specral pohcc forces for
an operatlon. tasks u'rll have to be adapted to
crrcumstances.
90 WEU countrres have the expenencc.
knouledge and pohce forces which are appro-
pnate for a ''thrrd force" As an organlsatton,
WEU has garned expcnence m spectal pohce
operatrons rn difficult clrcumstances and thrs
should be the basrs for the development of a
"thrrd forcc" doctrme The WEU Council should
also serrouslv recommend the WEU natrons to
desrgnate spccral pohce untts rvhich can be
placed at the drsposal of WEU. stmtlar to the
s\ stcm developed for FAWEU, rn order to
facrlrtate the raprd deplolmcnt of such spectal
forces rf requrred ln cnsls sltuatlons
te llnanaal Tmes,29 March 1998.
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